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This paper suggests that debt should be raised by subsidiaries in order to exploit the limited 
liability of the holding company. However, when this behavior increases the cost of funds, the 
holding might prefer to raise debt  to a point where it would also default when subsidiaries are 
insolvent. 
After accounting for standard controls, we find that holding companies in Italian pyramids 
have higher leverage than subsidiaries and that the cash flow share of the entrepreneur in the 
subsidiary does not play a significant role. These findings are consistent with the implications of our 
model of group capital structure.  
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Business groups are a common corporate organizational form in several continental 
European and developing countries1. Frequently, they have a pyramidal structure with a holding 
company at the top and various layers of subsidiaries below. The entrepreneur typically has the 
majority of voting rights in every company, either directly in the holding or indirectly in the 
subsidiaries. A major source of finance for groups is debt, yet no model of pyramids explains how 
debt is chosen and allocated across group-affiliated companies. This paper investigates theoretically 
group capital structure and its welfare implications, and empirically how debt is allocated within 
Italian groups. 
Traditional capital structure theories refer to a stand-alone company. However the capital 
structure of group-affiliated companies is richer since they have access to both the internal (within 
the group) and the external capital market. This structure might be affected, among other factors, by 
the law: in major jurisdictions the holding has indeed no obligation for the insolvency of its 
operating subsidiaries, unless it is proved that it was directly responsible, i.e., the holding enjoys 
limited liability
2
. Our model builds specifically on this insight - previously ignored in the corporate 
finance or business group literature - suggesting that subsidiaries should raise a large fraction of 
group debt, since limited liability insures the holding company from costly bankruptcy in adverse 
contingencies. However, if lenders cannot monitor the risk of projects, the entrepreneur may 
allocate riskier projects in the operating unit. Anticipating this, lenders might charge higher interest 
rates. It may therefore pay the entrepreneur to commit not to increase excessively the risk taken by 
subsidiaries by raising the holding company’s debt to such a level that it would default together with 
the operating unit when the latter is insolvent.  
                                                 
1
  See Barca and Becht (2002) for Europe and Khanna (2000) for developing countries. 
2
 See Blumberg (1989) for the US, Hadden (1996) on Britain, France, Germany and the US, and Libonati (1996) 
on Italy. Limited liability for the holding company sometimes requires that the subsidiary is not fully owned by the 
group.  
 3 
Most of the literature on pyramidal groups emphasizes the agency problem between the 
group controlling agent and subsidiaries’ minority shareholders, associated with the low share of 
cash-flow that the entrepreneur is entitled to in operating subsidiaries and hence with the 
opportunities for their expropriation (Bebchuk, 1999; Bebchuk et al., 2000). While these theories 
rationalize why stock markets are underdeveloped in countries where pyramidal groups are 
common, they cannot explain why banking sectors are well developed in the same countries. In 
other words, they explain the costs of pyramidal structures but not their potential advantages. By 
focusing on the relationship with lenders, we take a first step in this last direction3.  
Our empirical analysis concerns group affiliated Italian companies, for which unconsolidated 
accounts are available. Thanks to these data - usually not available through major commercial data 
providers - we are able to distinguish between external debt, obtained from outside-the-group 
financiers only, and total loans obtained from other group-affiliated units. Hence our empirical 
analysis focuses on each company’s external debt4. This is related  to the entrepreneur’s cash-flow 
share and to the type - holding or operating subsidiary - of company, while controlling for firm 
specific factors affecting its comparative advantage in raising debt. Our results  are consistent with 
the predictions of the model, as we find that holding companies raise a larger portion of external 
debt over assets while other capital structure theories bear different implications.  
The paper is organized as follows. The details of the model are presented in section 2. 
Section 3 contrasts the implications of previous capital structure theories with those of our model. In 
section 4 we present the empirical analysis.  
                                                 
3
  For analyses of investments in internal capital markets, see a topic which which matters for both  conglomerates  
(Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994; Stein, 1997 and ; Rajan et al., 2000, for conglomerates and  groups (Perotti and 
Gelfer, 2001 for groups.  
4
 Empirical studies of capital structure (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Faccio et al, 2000; Booth et al. 2001) use 
consolidated accounts when investigating companies with subsidiaries, thus by-passing the issue of the allocation of debt 
among them. An exception is Piga (2002). Research on groups addresses tunneling (Bertrand et al., 2002), takeovers 
(Boehmer, 2000), company discount (Cornell and Liu, 2001), managerial turnover (Franks and Mayer, 2001; Volpin, 
2002),  diversification and risk sharing (Khanna and Yafeh, 2001; Khanna and Palepu, 2000) and liquidity constraints 






2. A model of debt financing in group-affiliated companies.  
2.1. The set -up. 
The group is composed of a holding and an operating subsidiary, indexed by j=1,2. The 
former can start one investment project, whereas the latter has an option to two alternative projects. 
The cash-flow from running the holding company project is 1k, where k=H,L indicates the level of 
realized cash-flow in the high and low profitability states respectively. Cash-flow in the holding is 
equal to 1H>0 with probability p and to 1L =0 with probability (1-p). Similarly, the subsidiary’s 
cash flow is equal to 2Hi>0 with probability qi and 0 with probability (1-qi)
5. The subscript i={s,r} 
indexes the safer  and riskier  investment projects respectively.  
The entrepreneur’s cash flow share in each company is equal to cj. We analyze the case of no 
outside equity (c1 =c2=1) as well as the typical case for groups (1c1 >c2 >0), where outside equity is 
larger in the operating unit. All agents are risk neutral, and there is free entry in banking. 
Assumption 1: limited liability. The holding company enjoys limited liability, i.e., the subsidiary’s 
lenders cannot claim the holding’s assets. This is the only crucial characteristic identifying the 
holding in our model.6 
Assumption 2: dissipative bankruptcy. The holding company’s bankruptcy destroys an amount y>0 
of resources. This represents the entrepreneur’s investment in asset specific human capital, that is 
lost if the firm is liquidated. The size of these losses in the real world will depend on the features of 
bankruptcy law7.  
                                                 
5
  These probabilities are conditional on publicly available information. We do not model superior information on 
investment opportunities enjoyed by the entrepreneur, which has already been emphasized by Stein (1997).  
6
             Personal limited liability is relevant for capital structure in a stand-alone company (Hellwig,1981). Our insight 
- so far ignored in corporate finance - concerns corporate limited liability, which is also shown to affect product market 
strategies by Cestone and Fumagalli (2004). 
7
  They are larger when enforcement of creditors’ rights is strict. This makes it more difficult to keep a profitable 
enterprise in distress as a going concern. Enforcement is strict and the debtor loses control in several countries where 
business groups are common, such as Germany, France and Italy (Rajan and Zingales, 1995, p.1446-47). 
 5 
Foregone private benefits of control are one way to represent bankruptcy costs: we choose it 
here because both Nicodano (1998) and Volpin (2002) find that private benefits in Italian holding 
companies are positive and Dyck and Zingales (2004)  argue that they are large in the international 
comparisons8. 
Assumption 3: cross-subsidies. The entrepreneur can shift cash flows across the group and decides 
the proportion of debt, , which is raised by the operating subsidiary. This assumption is at odds 
with company law requiring firm directors and managers to behave in the best interest of firm’s 
shareholders rather than of the group’s entrepreneur. However this legal restriction is not fully 
enforced in major jurisdictions (Hadden, 1996). Indeed, cash flows can be transferred in a variety of 
ways. The firm needing a cash transfer may get an internal loan; and/or obtain resources and 
materials at below-market prices; and/or sell assets to another group company.  
Assumption 4: equity rationing. An amount D of external resources must be raised through debt in 
order to finance group investment projects, because raising all outside financing as equity capital is 
not possible. This restriction can be ascribed to agency problems between the entrepreneur and 
minority shareholders - as in Hellman and Stiglitz (2000); and/or to coordination problems among 
entrepreneurs leading to a low liquidity trap in the stock market– as in Pagano (1993).  
Assumption 5: cash flows from the riskier and the safer project in the subsidiary. The riskier project 
is less likely to have positive cash-flow: qs>qr. However, its cash-flow is larger conditional on being 
positive: 2Hs <2Hr. Finally the expected cash flow from the riskier project is higher: 
(1)                2Hs qs - 2Hr qr =  <0.  
This assumption ensures that the riskier project is not dominated by the safer one. At the same time, 
the higher expected cash flow from the riskier project does not imply that it is preferred by a risk 
neutral entrepreneur, because bankruptcy costs must be accounted for.  
Assumption 6: the (relevant) state space consists of four states {HH, LL, HL, LH}, where the first 
                                                 
 
 6 
letter refers to the holding company and the second one to the subsidiary.  In state HH group  cash-
flow exceeds  group debt, as specified by the following equation: 
(2) D < 2Hi + 1H,    for i={r,s}. 
In state LH the subsidiary’s cash flow is sufficient to reimburse group debt, even when the safer 
project is implemented:   
(3) D < 2Hi ,            for i={r,s}. 
In state HL, the positive cash-flow from the holding is lower than group debt:  
(4) D > 1H 
State HL is crucial for our argument in that the holding’s limited liability  may play a role. 
We could consider another state in which the losses of the subsidiary are not so large, in which case 
the holding company could both lend to and rescue the operating subsidiary. But this state is not 
essential, so we drop it for simplicity. 
Assumption 7a(7b): lenders  are (not) able to monitor project risk. 
 Assumption 7a can be expected to hold when groups have an “inside” or “main” bank, such as in 
the German and the Japanese financial system.  
 
2.2. The first-best capital structure in business groups. 
We now determine a cutoff value for  and an associated interest rate such that, if <i’, in 
state H the parent is unable to service its own debt. In other words the holding must receive funds 
from its subsidiary in order to service its debt in state HH, and goes bankrupt together with the 
subsidiary in state HL. When  >i’, the holding’s debt is low enough that it can use its  limited 
liability in state HL. 
Lemma 1: assume A7(a). Then the interest factor charged to the holding company  is equal to: 
                                         1/ [p+(1-p)qi]                                              if  i’ 
(5)    R1i()=   
 7 
                                         [D(1-)-p(1-qi) 1H]/ D(1-)q i                 if < i’ 
and  the holding can service its own external debt in state H so long as it is lower than the cutoff 
value:   
(6)              (1-i’)D =     [p+(1-p)qi]1H. 
The interest factor in the subsidiary is in turn: 
(7)            R2i= 1/qi . 
Proof:   
 The risk neutral lender’s participation constraint is satisfied if the interest factor ensures zero 
expected profits, i.e. if it  solves: 
(8)            qi pR1iD (1-)+ (1-p)qi R1iD (1-)+ p(1-qi) 1H =D(1-)          if  < i’ 
(9)          [qi p+ (1-p)qi +(1-qi)p] (1-) R1iD  =D(1-)                               if > i’. 
for the holding company. For the subsidiary:  
(10)        [qi p+ (1-p)qi ] R2iD  =D. 
The cutoff level of debt for the holding satisfies: 
(11)  (1-i’) R1i(  i’)D= 1H. 
where R1i  is evaluated at   i’. 
 When <i’, the parent defaults in state HL. The interest factor in equation (5) falls in the 
holding’s profits because they are appropriated by lenders in state HL. The risk of projects 
undertaken by the operating company, captured by qi, also affects credit conditions in the holding. 
Lenders charge a higher interest rate to the holding company with a riskier subsidiary because the 
holding is likelier to default (qr <qs). Therefore the holding company can sustain a smaller portion of 
total debt with its own cash flow, which implies  s’<r’.  
It is now possible to show that it pays the entrepreneur to raise debt from the operating 
company so as to avoid bankruptcy costs  by allowing the holding to use limited liability: 
Proposition 1 (debt in operating companies with “inside” lenders): assume A7a. Then the 
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operating unit raises a large enough portion of group debt (>i’) such that the holding company 
never defaults in state HL.  
Proof: The payoff  for the entrepreneur when >’ is equal to 
(12)         p[y+c11H –R1ic1D1] +(1-p)qi[y –R1ic1D1] + qic2[2Hi – R2i D2] = 
= pc11H + qic22Hi +y[ p+(1-p)qi] –D[c1(1-)+ c2] 
where D1 = (1-)D is debt in the holding, D2 is debt in the subsidiary, and  (5), (7),  (9) are 
accounted for. The first term in (12) is his/her share of profits net of debt costs plus private benefits 
from the holding  in states HH and HL; the second term are private benefits from the holding net of  
debt costs in state LH; the last term are his/her share of profits in the subsidiary in state LH and 
HH. 
The entrepreneur’s payoff, when <’, reflects that the holding defaults in state HL because it 
cannot use limited liability. Hence the first term in (13) below considers net his or her payoff  from 
the holding in state HH only: 
(10)(13)                qi p[c11H + y – R1ic1]+ (1-p)qi [y – R1ic1D1] +  qic2  [2Hi – R2i D2] = 
                         = pc11H + qic22Hi + yqi  - D[c1(1-)+ c2] 
where (5), (7) and (8) are accounted for. 
It is easy to check that (12)> (13) since  yp(1-qi)>0, which are the private benefits saved in state HL 
thanks to  limited liability. Hence (>i’) maximizes the entrepreneur’s payoff.  
 
Remark 1: Proposition 1 establishes that the entrepreneur sets >i’ so as to use the holding 
company’s limited liability vis-à-vis inside lenders. On top of this, inspection of (12) reveals that 
s/he has an incentive to set =1 whenever his or her cash-flow share is lower in the subsidiary than 
in the holding (c1>c2). Thus doing, the entrepreneur shifts onto the minority shareholders a larger 
portion of the interest cost of external debt. This result implies that, if >i’, we should observe a 
negative correlation between the external debt of group affiliated units and the entrepreneur’s cash 
Formattati: Elenchi puntati e
numerati
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flow share when we examine the data.   
Remark 2: In our set up the holding company delivers private benefits from control, while the 
operating company does not. Moreover, there is one state of nature in which the operating unit is 
unprofitable and cannot be rescued by the holding company. This remark clarifies that the only 
asymmetric feature that matters for our results is assumption A1 (limited liability), while 
asymmetric private benefits and state space are simplifying assumptions. Indeed consider the 
opposite case, when only the subsidiary yields private benefits from control and there is one state of 
nature in which the holding is insolvent and cannot be rescued by its subsidiary. Then capital 
structure is undetermined. In particular, the opposite debt allocation (debt being raised by the 
holding) is not strictly preferred to any other, because the operating unit is involved in the 
reorganization anyway – with loss of private benefits - if the holding goes bankrupt. This is because 
the holding’s lenders have an indirect claim on the operating unit’s assets.  
  
We now characterize the first best equilibrium.  
Proposition 2 (the first best equilibrium): a social planner chooses the safer project (i=s) and 
larger debt in the operating company (>s’)  if      
(14)         +y(1-p)(qs –qr )>0. 
Proof:  equation (12) and equation (13) evaluated at c1 =c2 =1 measure the aggregate payoff to 
both the entrepreneur and the minority shareholders, when (>i’) and (<i’) respectively. It can 
be checked that (12)>(13) at c1 =c2 =1.  
There are then two candidate first-best allocations, both entailing (>i’), that differ in the level of 
risk chosen by the subsidiary. The social planner opts for the safer project if its expected payoff 
(left-hand side) exceeds the one from the risky project (right-hand side):  
(15)  p1H + qs2Hs +y[ p+(1-p)qs] > p1H + qr2Hr +y[ p+(1-p)qr] . 
The first term, on both the left- and right-hand sides,  are profits from the holding company in state 
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HH and HL, the second term are profits from the subsidiary in states HH and LH,   while the third 
term are private benefits from control in states HH, HL and LH. It is easy to check that (12) 
simplifies to (14). 
 
 The social planner thus chooses debt in the operating company (>i’), since it maximizes 
both the entrepreneur’s payoff and the minority shareholders’ profits without affecting the lenders, 
who always break even. The planner also implements the safer project when the larger cash-flow 
from the riskier project is more than offset by the increased bankruptcy costs.  In the sequel, 
inequality (14) is assumed to be satisfied, ensuring the optimality of the safer project. 
 
2.3. Equilibrium capital structure when risk cannot be monitored by lenders.  
The Nash equilibrium needs not coincide with the first best equilibrium when there are no 
inside lenders, as the following Lemma clarifies: 
Lemma 2: assume A7b. Suppose that lenders charge the safe rate of interest (Ri=Rs) and that debt is 
raised by the subsidiary (s’). Then the entrepreneur prefers the riskier investment project (i=r) 
provided that inequality (17) below is satisfied at s’. If this is the case, the Nash equilibrium does 
not coincide with the first best equilibrium. If (17) is not satisfied at =1, then the Nash equilibrium 
coincides with the first best equilibrium.  
Proof: the payoff to the entrepreneur from implementing the riskier project, when the safer interest 
rate is charged by the outside lenders  and s’,  is equal to: 
(16)     pc11H + qrc22Hr +y[ p+(1-p)qr] –R1sc1D1[p+(1-p)qr]- c2R2sD2qr= 
= pc11H + qrc22Hr +y[ p+(1-p)qr] –D{c1(1-)x + c2( qr/qs )]} 
where  x=[(1-p)qr+p]/[p+(1-p)qs]<1. 
This must be compared with equation (12) evaluated at i=s, which assumes that the entrepreneur 
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implements the safer project consistent with the interest rate charged by lenders. So the riskier 
project is chosen if (16) < (12), i.e. if: 
              pc11H + qrc22Hr +y[ p+(1-p)qr] –D{c1(1-)x + c2( qr/qs )]}> 
              pc11H + qsc22Hs +y[ p+(1-p)qs] –D[c1(1-)+ c2]          that simplifies to: 
 (17)     c2 + y(1-p)( qs –qr)+ D{c1(1-)(x-1) + c2[( qr/qs )-1]}<0. 
The sum of the first two terms in (17) is positive given that project s is the first best project (from 
equation 14). The term in curly brackets is negative, and represents the lower cost of debt coming 
from fooling the lenders. It decreases in   for c1 c2. So if (17) is satisfied at s’, it will be satisfied 
for all >s’, in which case the Nash equilibrium is not the first best equilibrium because the 
entrepreneur prefers the riskier project.  
Thus the entrepreneur would implement the riskier investment project in operating 
companies when net gains from “fooling” the lender are positive. Gains are given by the reduction 
in the repayment probability, which the outside lender fails to incorporate in the interest rate, and 
the excess revenue from the riskier project (c2), while its cost is the increase in expected 
bankruptcy costs y(1-p)( qs –qr) associated with the higher likelihood of the subsidiary being 
unsuccessful. 
This Lemma delivers some counterintuitive insight into the nature of private benefits. These 
are often considered as welfare reducing by the literature on pyramids, the more so the lower the 
cash-flow share of the entrepreneur. For instance, large private benefits and low cash-flow shares 
distort the entrepreneur’s investment choices in Bebchuk et al (2000). Our second best analysis 
delivers a different implication. When banks cannot monitor risk, larger private benefits in the 
holding and a lower cash flow share in subsidiaries make deviations from the first best allocation 
less likely, as implicit in equation (17). The reason is that the entrepreneur prefers protecting her 
private benefits rather than increasing cash flows by implementing riskier projects in the subsidiary. 
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Indeed private benefits are lost more often when riskier projects are chosen  because the probability 
of subsidiary’s success is lower.  
When the Nash equilibrium does not coincide with the first best, then there are two other 
candidate equilibrium allocations. In the first, the risky project is implemented, lenders charge the 
higher interest rate and debt in the subsidiary exceeds r’. This is sub-optimal in that the operating 
company is insolvent too often relative to the first best. In the other candidate equilibrium,  falls 
below s’ thus impeding the holding company’s  limited liability.  
Proposition 3 (second best equilibrium with “outside” lenders): assume A7b and (17) satisfied 
at s’. Then the equilibrium is  characterized by (a) a small share of group debt in the operating 
company,  the safer project in the subsidiary and the safer interest rate charged by lenders {<s’; 
i=s; Ri =Rs} if both (20) and (22) hold; (b) it is characterized by {r’; i=r; Ri =Rr}otherwise. 
Proof: The entrepreneur’s payoffs  in the candidate equilibria (a) and (b) are respectively given 
by equation (13) evaluated at i=s:   
(18)     pc11H + qsc22Hs + yqs  - D[c1(1-)+ c2],  and by equation (12), where the holding 
company’s limited liability in state HL is accounted for,  evaluated at i=r: 
(16)(19)        pc11H + qrc22Hr +y[ p+(1-p)qr] –D[c1(1-)+ c2];  
The entrepreneur prefers (a) to (b) only if  (18) exceeds (19), that is only if the following inequality 
holds:  
(20) c2+y{qs –[p+(1-p)qr]}>0. 
In order for (a) to be an equilibrium, higher debt in the holding must actually serve as a 
commitment device not to increase risk. This is true only if the entrepreneur’s payoff from choosing 
the riskier project, at  < s: 
(21) qr p[c11H + y – (1+r1s)c1]+[y – R1sc1D1](1-p)qr+  qrc2  [2Hr – R2s D2] = 
Formattati: Elenchi puntati e
numerati
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           qr pc11H + qrc22Hr + yqr  – R1sc1D1qr - c2R2s D2qr= 
            = pc11H [qr–1+(1-qs)(qr /qs)] +qrc22Hr + yqr  - D[c1(1-)+ c2](qr /qs) 
 is lower than the payoff from choosing the safer project (equation 15). This occurs only if:  
(22)      -c2 + y( qr –qs)+ pc11H [(qr /qs)-1] - D{[c1(1-) + c2][( qr/qs )-1]}<0. 
 Only if both (22) and (20) hold, lenders charge the low-risk rate and the entrepreneur prefers 
commitment to lower risk  for all 9. If (20) is violated, the entrepreneur prefers the riskier project 
even if (22) is satisfied, that is even if  s/he could credibly commit to the safer one. Finally, if (22) 
does not hold, debt in the holding is not a credible commitment not to increase risk. Thus lenders 
charge the high-risk rate no matter where debt is located. It follows that the entrepreneur prefers 
debt in the subsidiary - which minimizes the loss of private benefits - and the riskier investment 
project even if (20) holds. 10 
Figure 1 summarizes the equilibrium allocations of debt. In the following section we contrast 
their implications with those of competing theories. 
 
3. External debt in group-affiliated companies 
The capital structure literature does not explicitly address the issue of debt allocation in 
business groups (see, for example, Harris and Raviv, 1991). In this section we discuss the 
implications of some existing theories, as well as those of our model of group borrowing.  
H1. The managerial discipline hypothesis: External debt is higher in operating than in holding 
companies and is negatively correlated with the entrepreneur’s cash-flow share. Debt is a 
disciplining device for managers when there is separation of ownership from control, and 
                                                 
9
  We checked numerically that there exists a non-empty set of parameter values such that (22) and (20) hold, 
satisfying also (17) and (14). 
11  It could be argued that holding companies can write guarantee letters in favor of subsidiaries’ lenders, so as to 
avoid a costlier commitment. Such letters cannot however substitute for external debt in holding companies as a 
commitment device, because they are legally unenforceable contracts. Their existence has been explained as a welfare-
 14 
managerial objectives differ from shareholders’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In a business group 
the entrepreneur usually owns larger equity stakes in holding companies and is often the CEO. 
Hence debt should be higher in subsidiaries, which are often run by managers without equity stakes. 
H2. The holding’s limited liability hypothesis: External debt is higher in operating units and is 
negatively correlated with the entrepreneur’s cash-flow share. In our model the entrepreneur 
chooses the amount of group debt to be raised by the holding company and by its operating unit 
from external financiers. S/he also chooses the risk level characterizing the investment project of the 
operating unit, which cannot be observed by the lender. Two features of the model are crucial. The 
first is the limited liability enjoyed by the holding company vis-à-vis the debt obligations of the 
operating unit. The second is costly bankruptcy. In this framework raising external debt from the 
operating unit gives the entrepreneur the option of avoiding group bankruptcy by letting the single 
operating unit go bankrupt, when it is insolvent. This hypothesis correspond to two equilibrium 
allocations in our model, namely the first best equilibrium (Proposition 2 and Lemma 2) and the 
second best equilibrium (b) of Proposition 3. 
H3. Commitment to lower risk hypothesis: External debt is higher in holding companies and the 
correlation between external debt and the entrepreneur’s cash-flow share is non-negative. Since an 
outside lender charges a higher interest rate when the holding company is protected against the 
default in operating units (because s/he anticipates the potential increase in risk), it may pay the 
entrepreneur to commit not to increase risk in operating units. This is achieved by having the 
holding company raise a sufficiently high amount of external debt that the holding goes bankrupt 
together with the subsidiary, when the latter is insolvent. This hypothesis corresponds to the second 
best equilibrium allocation (a) of Proposition 3. 
H4. The Irrelevance Hypothesis: Holding and operating companies do not show systematic 
differences in external debt, when other firm’s characteristics are controlled for. Traditional capital 
                                                                                                                                                                  
improving mechanism trading-off reputation for preservation of financial capital (Boot et al., 1993).  
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structure theories, surveyed by Harris and Raviv (1991), suggest that several firm characteristics – 
such as profitability and collateral - affect firm capital structure. Once such factors are controlled 
for, however, company type should not matter. 
 
4.  Empirical analysis 
We now explore how debt is allocated across companies in a sample of Italian groups, 
controlling for other firm characteristics.  
 
 4.1 Sample description 
 Our samples consist of two cross-sections of group affiliated joint-stock companies for the 
years 1992 and 1996. Each is obtained by matching two data sets. The first contains information 
provided by listed companies to the Italian stock market supervisory authority (CoNSoB). Corporate 
law mandates that shareholdings exceeding 2 per cent of outstanding equity be reported to CoNSoB. 
Furthermore all equity stakes larger than 10 per cent, which are held by a listed company, must be 
disclosed. Group structure is reconstructed in two ways through such reports. The first is through 
the explicit information about control relationships reported to CoNSoB by each listed company. 
The second is through the use of algorithms which – on the basis of shareholders’ stakes – identify 
the existence of control relationships (such as 51% voting rights) when not explicitly stated. These 
data thus depict the pyramidal structure of all “listed groups”, which include at least one listed 
company.  
Data include all shareholders of listed companies with holdings larger than 2 per cent and all 
listed companies’ shareholdings exceeding 10 per cent. We are therefore able to construct the “cash 
flow share”, as the sum that is actually invested in the company by the entrepreneur divided by total 
equity capital. This variable is computed by accounting for the controlling agent’s direct and 
 16 
indirect shareholdings along the control chain. For example, if agent A controls company B with a 
50 per cent share and B controls company C with a 50 per cent share, the cash flow share of A in C 
is 25 per cent
11
. The original data set has information on approximately 4.000 companies, but we 
exclude listed and unlisted companies not belonging to a group and those without a code that allows 
a match with balance sheet data: the result for 1996 is 2611 observations. 
 The second data set (Centrale dei Bilanci) reports balance sheet information for 
approximately 30.000 Italian joint-stock companies. From this we retrieve information on firm’s 
total debt and credit, and in particular on both bank debt and internal debt, i.e. debt towards other 
companies in the group. Unfortunately, no information is available on the interest rate applied on 
bank loans or on loans received through the internal capital market. 
  We exclude from our sample bank holding companies and insurance companies, since their 
liabilities are not directly comparable to the debt issued by non-financial firms. Industrial groups in 
Italy do not include a “main bank” as in Japan or Germany. However they may include operating 
firms specializing in leasing and factoring, which we identify in the regressions through dummies. 
We also include state-owned companies, that might have been subject to political pressures and 
whose debt was guaranteed by the state. In the regression analysis we distinguish between financial 
and non-financial operating companies, and between state-owned and privately held companies.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics concerning our sample. The number of group-affiliated 
firms for which we also have balance sheet information is 728 for 1996 (700 for 1992). They belong 
to 95 (101) groups. Our data sources classify them as holding companies when their main activity is 
to hold shares of other companies in the group. In our sample 86 (117) are holding companies, 573 
(528) are operating companies outside the financial sector and 69 (55) are operating companies in 
the financial sector (leasing, factoring ). In 1996 the mean number of companies per group is 35, of 
which 20.5% are listed.  
                                                 
11
  For details on this variable and its value in Italian listed companies, see Bianchi et al. (2002). 
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While our sample contains almost all listed companies, it only has information on 33.3 % of 
companies per group. This is because Centrale dei Bilanci reports balance sheets for a sample (not 
the universe) of Italian joint-stock companies. Moreover it does not cover partnerships. Finally, 
some joint stock companies might also be excluded by us because of a mismatch of their fiscal 
identification code between our data sources. We are not able to obtain any information concerning 
the characteristics of excluded partnerships. However, we find some information about 515 joint 
stock companies not present in the Centrale dei Bilanci sample with a different data provider 
(Cerved). These are quite small, in that they have 11% of mean debt and 10% of mean assets of our 
728 companies. Thus our sample is biased towards larger joint-stock companies. This bias is likely 
to be smaller than in most empirical studies of capital structure, that focus on listed joint stock 
companies only. Moreover,  leverage of excluded joint stock companies is comparable in size to that 
of the companies included in our data set. Thus sample selection bias is unlikely to affect our 
inference, as far as the capital structure choice of joint stock companies is concerned.  
We consider three measures of debt financing (scaled with total assets): total financial debt 
(debt for short), bank debt and net external debt. The first one includes debt financing from all 
sources - including financial companies as well as bond issues. The second one is the conventional 
measure of bank debt. The third one is the difference between debt and total financial credit from 
sources outside the group. It is the best approximation to the “external financing needs” that matter 
in theoretical models. Columns (a) and (b), referring to the whole sample in 1996, show that both 
holding and financial companies have higher debt ratios (.27 and .35) than operating subsidiaries 
(.16). The same is true for bank debt (.17 and .19 versus .12) and for net external debt (.31 and .19 
versus .15). A similar pattern emerges for private companies in columns (c) and (d). We discuss the 
1992 figures in section 4.3. 
So as to complete the picture of group capital structure we also measure net internal debt as 
the difference between financial debt and financial credit towards firms belonging to the same 
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group. Holding companies are net lenders to subsidiaries (-0.07) while both financial and operating 
companies are net borrowers (0.02 and 0.07 respectively).12 
Firm profitability is measured by its return on investment (net profits plus interest payments 
scaled by the sum of financial debt and equity). The numerator accounts for both operating income 
and income from financial assets. We prefer this measure to operating income which could 
underestimate the profitability of holding companies, whose major source of revenues is financial 
operations. Holding companies show a markedly lower profitability than operating companies, 
which - as we discuss in section 4.4 - is accompanied by moderately lower profit volatility.  
In Table 1, we also distinguish operating units with minority shareholders. These may suffer 
from risk shifting more than other subsidiaries, because they are not fully owned by their direct 
parent. As a consequence the upstream company enjoys limited liability.13 Moreover, the cash flow 
share of the entrepreneur is decreasing as we proceed from holding companies to financial and non 
financial operating companies, and reaches a minimum for companies which are not fully owned by 
their direct parent. For both reasons one may expect them to have higher debt than other operating 
companies, if H2 prevails. Descriptive statistics show that they tend to have higher (bank and/or net 
external) debt than other operating companies. 
Finally, the share of non-financial assets - which can be pledged as collateral - is very low 
for holding companies (4.16) while it is much larger for operating companies (19.59).  
 
4.2 Regression results 
The results of the regression analysis for the year 1996 are displayed in Table 2. The 
dependent variable is net external financial debt over total assets, as this captures borrowing from 
                                                 
12 More than 50% of companies in our sample do not borrow internally, as revealed by median internal debt being 
equal to zero. However, a relevant portion of companies uses the internal capital market: firms with either positive 
internal debt and/or positive internal credit  account for 80% of asset value. 
13
  These companies are also subject to legal restrictions, because company law requires firm directors and 
managers to behave in the best interest of firm’s shareholders rather than of the group’s entrepreneur. However there 
have been cases where courts accepted as valid operations performed in the interest of the group as a whole. 
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outside-the-group lenders. The use of the book value of debt plus equity as a scaling variable leads 
to qualitatively similar results (slightly different point estimates, equal statistical significance) that 
are not reported.  
The theoretical hypotheses summarized in section 2 refer to the allocation of debt within 
each pyramid, hence we introduce group dummies. “Financial” and “operating” are dummy 
variables which distinguish such types of firms from holding companies. We also consider “listed” 
companies as potentially special, since they are subject to stricter stock market monitoring and 
disclosure requirements. This may reduce the cost of credit by increasing the firm’s bargaining 
power with banks and/or overcome borrowing constraints  (Pagano,Panetta, Zingales, 1998). 
Firm size (measured as the log of total assets), profits (ROI) and non financial assets (NFA) 
are control variables, common in the literature on capital structure (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). We 
cannot include a measure of market risk since not all companies are listed.  
We report in column A results for all groups, in column B we exclude groups for which we 
have only one observation; in column C we also exclude state owned firms, and in the last column 
we eliminate financial operating companies. Results are stronger for privately held firms, although 
qualitatively similar for the whole sample. 
The regression analysis confirms that, even after controlling for profitability, size, etc., 
holding companies have more external debt than (operating and financial) subsidiaries. Higher 
leverage in holding companies is not consistent with either the managerial discipline H1, or the 
irrelevance H4 or the limited liability hypotheses H2. However, it is consistent with H3, the 
commitment to lower risk hypothesis.  
The lack of explanatory power of the cash-flow share points to the absence of a disciplining 
role for external debt, against H1. It also seems to rule out the shifting of interest payments onto the 
minority shareholders of operating companies, which would occur under the limited liability 
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hypothesis (see Remark 1 to Proposition 1). Indeed, both hypotheses imply a negative correlation 
between external debt and the cash-flow share.  
The coefficient of the dummy “minority*operating”, indicating operating companies with 
minority shareholders, is not significantly different from zero. This finding again runs counter the 
limited liability hypothesis H2.  Overall, the commitment to lower risk hypothesis (H3) through 
larger debt in holding companies is the only surviving hypothesis. Their larger debt exposure also 
confirms the specificity of holding companies that have been shown to be characterized by lower 
managerial turnover (Volpin, 2002) as well as higher voting premium (Nicodano, 1998) than their 
operating subsidiaries. 
 
For what concerns other control variables, size is usually positively related to external debt 
implying that larger companies raise more funds, possibly because of stronger bargaining power and 
hence better credit conditions. Profits (ROI) are negatively correlated with external leverage, as in 
previous empirical work on capital structure (Fama and French, 2002; Harris and Raviv, 1991, p. 
337). Listed companies show lower levels of external debt than other firms, against our priors. We 
therefore interpret this result as being driven by lower demand for external debt by listed companies, 
which take the opportunity to reduce leverage – as in Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998). 
The share of tangible assets should be positively correlated with the ability to raise external 
debt, because collateral makes it costlier for the entrepreneur to increase risk, thus reducing the 
expected cost of insolvency to the lender (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Hellman and Stiglitz, 2000; 
Bester, 1985). Its coefficient turns out to be positive, but it is never statistically different from zero.  
Taxes are another well-known determinant of capital structure. Here we do not control for 
tax rates as there was no difference across group-affiliated units in the sample period. Taxes were 
levied on each company without consolidation of group profits14. The total tax burden could have 
                                                 
14
  Double taxation of dividends was avoided through a tax credit mechanism. 
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been reduced only if units with positive income before taxes artificially raised their deductible costs 
to the benefit of units with negative income before taxes, for example by borrowing at higher-than-
market-rates from units with negative income (interest expenses are deductible). This might have 
induced a positive correlation between profits before taxes and internal debt, while the relationship 
with external debt is less obvious. Econometric results do not change when we substitute ROI with 
ROI before taxes as regressor, with the new variable slightly more significant than ROI. We also 
checked for an asymmetric value of debt as tax shield by inserting a dummy variable that is equal to 
1 when profit before taxes is positive. However, it does not add any explanatory power.  
The above regressions do not distinguish among industries. However, there may be 
systematic differences in leverage across industries (Harris and Raviv, 1991, p.334), due to their 
systematic risk and their unequal possibility to engage in asset substitution. To check for this we 
introduce industry dummies which capture each operating company’s main industry. The results 
(available from the authors) suggest that the negative coefficients of the operating company 
dummies in Table 2 are determined by companies in some industrial sectors, where most of the 
operating companies in our sample operate. 
 
4.3 Robustness over time: regression results prior to the Ferruzzi insolvency 
A large Italian group, Ferruzzi-Montedison, became insolvent in 1993. This event may be 
relevant to our analysis as the restructuring implied a large transfer of value from creditor of 
operating companies to those of the holding. Hence we check whether the data support H3 also prior 
to this insolvency, in 1992.  
Italian banks mostly lent to the holding company, while foreign banks’ lending was 
concentrated with the operating companies at the bottom of the pyramid among which Montedison 
was the largest one. Foreign debt accounted for 56% of Montedison bank debt in the lower layers of 
the pyramid, but only for 8.9% of the holding company debt. Creditors of Montedison lost 10% of 
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their exposure in the restructuring, while an Italian bank became the largest shareholder of the 
holding company with an estimated gain of $2bn15. 
Descriptive statistics for the year 1992 (Table 1, last four columns) point to a change in 
leverage between 92 and 96. Net external debt increases for holding companies - especially for 
private ones - and decreases for both financial and operating companies. These differences suggest a 
potential structural break, even if they are not statistically significant.  
We therefore run the same regression on our 1992 sample. Consistent with H3, the 
coefficient of the operating company dummy is negative already in 1992 (Table 3), but significant 
only for the full sample, i.e., not for private firms only. The entrepreneur’s cash-flow share is 
statistically significant and positive, against H1 and H2, meaning that debt was mainly allocated to 
the holding company and to the subsidiaries “closer” to the holding companies rather than to the 
most distant ones. This offers some evidence that the equilibrium-with-commitment prevailing in 
1996 was already in place in 199216.  
 
4.4 Robustness to specification changes    
A further explanation for the higher leverage observed in holding companies is their lower 
risk that may make lenders more willing to provide funds17. Indeed, risk can be lower in parent 
companies than in subsidiaries’ because the former resemble diversified portfolios. 
In order to check for the role of risk on the allocation of debt we resorted to another database 
(Cerved), which provides only a small subset of balance sheet figures for all joint stock companies: 
from this we obtained information on profits (ROI) for the previous years and computed volatility as 
                                                 
15
  See Penati and Zingales, 2000. 
16
  The coefficient of financial operating companies is not statistically different from zero and minority 
shareholders in operating companies seem to bear a larger share of external debt, as revealed by the positive coefficient 
of the dummy variable Operating* Minority. These changes in point estimates between 1996 and 1992 are never 
statistically significant. 
17
  Booth et al. (2000); Kale et al. (1991). 
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the standard deviation of profits over 5 years18. Volatility is indeed smaller for holding than 
operating companies both in the full sample (5.08 versus 6.24) and in private groups (4.88 versus 
6.26).  
The regression analysis on this set of data, including also volatility, is reported in Table 4. 
This new explanatory variable is not statistically significant and has a positive sign. All estimates 
are less efficient due to the loss in the number of observations. However, the financial and the 
operating company dummies retain statistical significance in the sample of private companies, and 
are close to statistical significance in the whole sample. Thus the inclusion of volatility does not 
change the picture obtained on the 1996 data: groups allocate a larger portion of their net external 
debt in holding companies.  
 
5. Concluding comments 
The literature on business groups has so far focused on the potential expropriation of 
minority shareholders by entrepreneurs in countries characterized by weak investor protection. This 
paper contributes to understanding pyramids by shifting the focus of the analysis from equity to 
debt, which is their main source of external funds. It also allows to clarify the role of the holding 
company’s limited liability, which is a feature of the law governing business groups in major 
jurisdictions.  
Our model stresses that limited liability of the holding company may reduce bankruptcy 
costs by allowing for partial default of unsuccessful operating units. Protecting some units from the 
failure of other units is welfare improving, and this improvement is increasing in the size of 
bankruptcy costs. This implication might be tested in a cross-section of countries: pyramidal 
structures should be more valuable relative to alternative organizational forms, and hence more 
common,  where bankruptcy procedures are costlier.  
                                                 
18
  The size of our original sample is no longer sufficient as less than half of companies are included every year. 
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Our empirical analysis sheds light on capital structure in group affiliated companies. In our 
sample holding companies raise a larger portion of external debt over assets and are net lenders to 
their subsidiaries. Furthermore, the correlation between company’s external debt and the 
entrepreneur’s cash flow share is positive, when statistically significant. This evidence is 
inconsistent with other theories of capital structure, which imply either larger debt in operating units 
or the irrelevance of group capital structure. This pattern mirrors instead one equilibrium of our 
model, where the entrepreneur commits not to increase risk in subsidiaries by levering up the 
holding company - thus giving up her option of rescuing the holding from the default of  operating 
subsidiaries.  
Empirical studies of capital structure usually focus on the consolidated balance sheets of 
listed companies. We extended the analysis to unlisted group-affiliated firms. However, smaller 
joint-stock companies as well as partnerships are not covered by our data sources. Further research 
could challenge the robustness of our findings on the basis of larger data-sets which may be 
available in other countries. Information concerning interest rates paid by holding and operating 
companies may also help to further discriminate among competing hypotheses concerning group 
capital structure.  
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This figure describes the equilibrium allocations of the model, assuming that the cash flow share of the entrepreneur is 
larger in the holding company. In state HL the holding is profitable  and the subsidiary is not (as indicated by the first 
and second subscripts, respectively).  is the proportion of group external debt allocated to the subsidiary and i’ is a 
cutoff value such that, for <i’, the holding goes bankrupt in state HL. The interest factor is Ri. The risk of the 
investment project in the subsidiary is indicated by i, which is either equal to r (riskier) or s (safer). The  implications 
of each equilibrium configurations are listed in the  left-hand side column. 
FIRST BEST EQUILIBRIUM 
 larger debt in subsidiaries 
 negative correlation between 
cash-flow share and debt 
 {>s’; Ri =Rs; i=s} 
The safer project is optimal even if it does not have the highest expected cash 
flow, because it has a higher probability of success. >s’ ensures that a 
profitable holding company is able to service its own debt, without transfers 
from its subsidiary. It also ensures, together with limited liability, that the 
holding does not incur into bankruptcy when the subsidiary is insolvent in 
state HL. 
EQUILIBRIUM WITH EXCESS RISK TAKING  
 larger debt in subsidiaries 
 negative correlation between 
cash-flow share and debt 
 
{{=1; Ri =Rr; i=r} 
The subsidiary is bankrupt too often because the risky project has a lower 
success probability. The entrepreneur saves from bankruptcy the holding 
company in state HL thanks to limited liability since > r’.  
 
EQUILIBRIUM WITH COMMITMENT NOT TO  INCREASE RISK  
 
  larger debt in the holding 
 non-negative correlation between 




{< s’; Ri =Rs; i=s} 
The holding is bankrupt too often. In particular, it is insolvent in state HL 
because it needs a transfer from a successful subsidiary in order to service its 
debt, which is “too high” since <s’. Limited liability is not  exploited. 
However, the safer project is implemented by the subsidiaty, which is not 





Table 1. Summary statistics 
Columns (a)-(d)  present descriptive statistics for our 1996  sample, while columns (e)-(h) refer to 1992.   
N. of firms per group: average number of firms belonging to a group,  according to the  Consob data set. 
% of firms per group in the sample: share of group-affiliated companies,  which is  included in our sample. 
% of listed companies per group: share of listed companies in each group, according to the  Consob data set. 
Bank debt: short and long term loans from banks. 
Debt: financial loans from all sources  (banks, other companies, bonds). 
Net external debt: debt net of all financial credit from external sources. 
Net internal debt: financial loans from other companies of the group net of financial credit towards companies of the group. 
ROI: return on investment; it is computed as the sum of net profits and interest payments, scaled by the sum of equity and financial debt 
Cash flow share: it is the share of cash-flow owned by the controlling agent in the company 
NFA: total non financial assets 
          
1996 
   1992   
         
 (a) 
Mean 














     
 All firms Private firms only All firms Private firms only 
     
N. of firms 728 550 700 506 
N. of firms per group 35 10 36 11 43.52 10.00 38.55 9.00 
% of firms per group in sample 33.3 33.3 33.1 31.8 25.94 25.00 25.83 25.00 
% of listed firms per group 20.5 9.0 22.8 10.1 23.56 14.29 24.33 16.49 
         
Debt / Total assets 0.19 0.11 0.21 0.14 0.24 0.17 0.26 0.20 
Holding 0.27 0.21 0.30 0.26 0.29 0.24 0.31 0.26 
Financial Companies 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.44 0.33 0.45 0.37 
Operating companies 0.16 0.10 0.18 0.12 0.21 0.16 0.23 0.18 
                       with minority shareholders         0.17            0.10        0.19 0.14 0.22 0.17 0.25 0.20 
 

















Holding 0.17 0.06 0.19 0.09 0.22 0.14 0.21 0.15 
Financial Companies 0.19 0.03 0.21 0.08 0.29 0.17 0.27 0.19 
Operating companies: 0.12 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.18 0.13 0.19 0.15 
               with minority shareholders         0.13            0.06          0.15 0.09 0.18 0.14 0.20 0.16 
         
Net external debt / Total assets 0.17 0.10 0.19 0.13 0.23 0.16 0.26 0.20 
Holding 0.31 0.28 0.37 0.37 0.30 0.23 0.31 0.28 
Financial Companies 0.19 0.08 0.19 0.10 0.28 0.21 0.29 0.23 
Operating companies 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.11 0.21 0.15 0.24 0.19 
             with minority shareholders         0.15            0.08         0.18 0.13 0.22 0.17 0.25 0.20 
         
Net internal debt / Total assets 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.002 0.00 
Holding -0.07 -0.002 -0.08 -0.004 -0.13 -0.06 -0.13 -0.04 
Financial Companies 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Operating companies 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 
             with minority shareholders         0.05            0.00          0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 
         
ROI 6.08 6.66 7.08 6.92 4.12 6.50 4.56 6.74 
Holding 1.71 3.82 1.89 3.82 0.89 5.22 0.99 5.02 
Financial Companies 3.42 4.66 2.83 4.34 7.03 7.34 7.73 7.73 
Operating companies 7.06 7.79 8.50 8.17 4.54 6.88 5.11 7.07 
             with minority shareholders         8.25         8.15 9.09 8.39 6.45 8.11 7.14 8.21 
         
Cash Flow Share 39.26 35.29 33.76 26.10 35.62 30.15 30.02 24.59 
Holding 48.08 50.21 45.01 44.06 47.31 44.77 44.15 38.51 
Financial Companies 41.98 41.82 39.43 40.38 37.06 30.09 30.90 29.12 
Operating companies 37.60 32.67 31.08 25.53 32.86 28.12 26.47 19.55 
            with minority shareholders       34.61          28.61        30.17 25.41 32.17 27.28 27.91 21.90 
         
NFA / Total assets 17.18 9.54 16.80 10.05 18.40 10.91 16.88 10.97 
Holding 4.16 0.20 3.65 0.24 5.84 0.36 3.03 0.39 
Financial Companies 13.31 0.06 10.52 0.03 25.83 1.14 15.66 0.82 
Operating companies 19.59 12.85 19.89 14.79 20.41 15.33 20.39 15.95 
          with minority shareholders       19.24          13.02          19.60          15.12        19.47 13.18 19.38 15.32 
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Table 2. Regression analysis of net external debt (1996) 
 
The dependent variables is net external debt of the company scaled by total assets. The regressors are the logarithm of 
total assets which proxies the size of the company (Size), dummies that identify Operating and Financial companies, a 
dummy for Listed companies, the value of the cash flow share of the controlling agent (Cash Flow Share), return on 
investments (ROI), the share of non financial assets over total assets (NFA), and the interaction between the dummies 
for Operating (Financial) companies and the dummy signaling whether the company is owned with less than 100 per 
cent shares (Minority shareholders). All the regressions include group dummies. In parentheses are t-statistics, based 
on White corrected standard errors. The estimates are obtained using the ”robust” option in Stata®.  
  
Dependent variable:   net 
external debt 
All firms  
(A) 
As (A), without groups 
with one observation  
(B) 
As (B), excluding 
state owned firms 
(C) 
As (C) excluding 
financial firms 
Size 0.018 (3.19) 0.017 (3.26) 0.019 (2.71) 0.018 (2.63) 
ROI -0.081 (1.95) -0.081 (-1.99) -0.087 (-1.64) -0.082 (-1.49) 
NFA 0.067 (1.37) 0.067 (1.40) 0.060 (0.90) 0.032 (0.46) 
Listed -0.073 (2.34) -0.073 (-2.39) -0.099 (-2.80) -0.090 (-2.43) 
Cash Flow Share 0.020 (0.27) 0.020 (0.27) -0.040 (-0.43) -0.036 (-0.30) 
Operating -0.090 (2.08) -0.090 (2.12) -0.155 (-3.03) -0.146 (-2.81) 
Operating*Minority 
shareholders 
-0.014 (0.72) -0.014 (-0.73) 0.011 (0.49) 0.005 (0.22) 
Financial -0.202 (-2.16) -0.202 (-2.20) -0.261 (-2.46)   
Financial*Minority 
shareholders 
0.067 (0.66) 0.068 (0.67) 0.044 (0.39)   
n. observations 728  699  521  469  
R2 0.34  0.25  0.29  0.32  
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Table 3. Regression analysis of net external debt (1992) 
 
This table replicates the regression of table 2 for the year 1992, prior to the Ferruzzi insolvency. 
 
Dependent variable = 
external debt 
All firms  
(A) 
As (A), excluding 
groups with one 
observation only 
(B) 
As (B), excluding 
state owned firms 
(C) 
As (C) excluding 
financial firms 
Size 0.013 (2.18) 0.013 (2.25) -0.001 (-0.11) 0.002 (0.23) 
ROI -0.154 (-2.12) -0.154 (-2.19) -0.252 (-2.68) -0.272 (-2.80) 
NFR 0.003 (0.06) 0.004 (0.07) 0.065 (0.67) -0.034 (-0.39) 
Listed -0.090 (-2.84) -0.090 (-2.92) -0.082 (-2.10) -0.074 (-1.81) 
Cash Flow Share 0.228 (2.87) 0.228 (2.96) 0.436 (3.12) 0.382 (2.64) 
Operating -0.076 (-1.99) -0.076 (-2.05) -0.062 (-1.22) -0.043 (-0.87) 
Operating*Minority 
shareholders 
0.034 (1.58) 0.034 (1.62) 0.038 (1.46) 0.031 (1.20) 
Financial -0.030 (-0.36) -0.030 (-0.37) -0.026 (-0.29)   
Financial*Minority 
shareholders 
-0.003 (-0.02) -0.003 (-0.02) 0.019 (0.13)   
R2   0.32  0.26  0.28  0.29  




Table 4. Regression analysis with volatility  (1996) 
 
This regression replicates those in table 2, including also the standard deviation of ROI over the period 1991-95 
(Volatility).  Several observations are lost in computing this variable, hence the lower values of the t statistics.   
 
Dependent variable:   net 
external debt 
All firms  
(A) 
As (A), without groups 
with one observation  
(B) 
As (B), excluding 
state owned firms 
(C) 
As (C) excluding 
financial firms 
Size 0.022 (3.13) 0.022 (3.19) 0.019 (2.39) 0.018 (2.31) 
ROI -0.132 (-2.00) -0.132 (-2.04) -0.139 (-1.64) -0.147 (-1.74) 
NFA 0.039 (0.85) 0.040 (0.87) -0.002 (-0.03) -0.017 (-0.24) 
Listed -0.088 (-2.48) -0.088 (-2.53) -0.109 (-2.75) -0.101 (-2.48) 
Cash Flow Share 0.041 (0.48) 0.041 (0.49) 0.000 (0.03) 0.000 (0.03) 
Volatility 0.002 (1.59) 0.002 (1.62) 0.001 (0.52) 0.001 (0.63) 
Operating -0.081 (-1.60) -0.081 (-1.63) -0.136 (-2.15) -0.128 (-2.01) 
Operating* Minority 0.000 (0.01) 0.001 (0.01) 0.018 (0.69) 0.015 (0.55) 
Financial -0.193 (-1.58) -0.193 (-1.61) -0.252 (-1.66)   
Financial* Minority 0.052 (0.37) 0.052 (0.38) 0.036 (0.22)   
n. observations 461  450  339  315  
R2 0.44  0.38  0.43  0.42  
 
 
 
